Jalgpallitaktika ja mängimise kujunemise ajalugu

Jalgpallitaktika ja mängimise kujunemise ajalugu

Jalgpallitaktikad on need strateegiad, mida ühe poole liikmed kasutavad oma vastastega kõige tõhusamalt konkureerimiseks. Need taktikad töötavad tavaliselt välja juhid või treenerid. Näiteks võib paremale äärekaitsjale öelda, et proovige sundida vasakpoolset vasakut paremale jooksma ja pange ta oma nõrgemat jalga kasutama.

Kõige tähtsam on see, et taktika viitab mängusüsteemile või meeskonna moodustamisele, mida kasutab juht või treener. Esimesed jalgpallimeeskonnad 19. sajandil kaldusid mängima kaheksast ründajast koosnevat süsteemi, kus kaitsjad olid väravavaht, poolkaitsja ja kolmveerand. 1870ndatel kasutasid edukad meeskonnad veidi teistsugust koosseisu, kuhu kuulusid seitse ründajat, kaks poolkaitsjat ja üks äärekaitsja. Sel perioodil pandi suurt rõhku üksikute inimeste dribbling -oskustele.

1880ndatel hakkasid William Sudell ja Tom Mitchell Šotimaalt mängijaid ostma ning nende meeskonnad Preston North End ja Blackburn Rovers said väga edukaks. Need mängijad tõid endaga kaasa nn Šoti stiili, mis pani rohkem rõhku söötmisele kui dribeldamisele.

Jalgpalliliiga esimene hooaeg algas septembris 1888. William Sudell ja tema Preston North Endi pool võitsid esimese meistritiitli kaotamata ühtegi mängu ja omandasid nime "võitmatud". Preston võitis ka Wolverhampton Wanderersi 3: 0, et võita 1889. aasta FA karikafinaal. Sel hooajal kasutas Sudell 2-3-5 formatsiooni (kaks äärekaitsjat, kolm poolkaitsjat ja viis ründajat).

Preston North Endi edu veenis teisi klubisid vastu võtma formatsiooni 2-3-5. See süsteem domineeris jalgpallis kuni 1925. aastani, kui FA otsustas kõrvalekalde reeglit muuta. Muudatus vähendas ründaja enda ja väravajoone vahel vajalike opositsioonimängijate arvu kolmelt kahele.

Arsenalis mänginud Charlie Buchan soovitas mänedžer Herbert Chapmanile, et meeskond kasutaks seda seadusemuudatust uue mängukoosseisu loomiseks. Mõte oli selles, et keskkaitsja, mitte kaks äärekaitsjat, peaksid vastutama väljalõksu eest. Äärepoolkaitsjad mängisid vahetult keskkaitsja ees, samas kui üks ründajaid toodi tagasi keskväljale. Seetõttu muudeti koosseis 2-3-5 asemel 3-3-4. See sai tuntuks ka kui "WM" formatsioon.

Süsteem arendas välja vasturünnakumängu. See tugines Alex James'i söötmisvõimele ja väravavahtidele nagu David Jack, Cliff Bastin, Jack Lambert ja Ted Drake. Edu ei olnud kohene ja alles 1930. aastal võitis Arsenal FA karikafinaali.

Järgmisel hooajal võitis Arsenal oma esimese esimese divisjoni meistritiitli. Suur osa hooajast 1931-32 sai Alex James vigastada ja see oli oluline tegur, et Arsenal kaotas tiitli kahe punktiga Evertonile. James oli hooajal 1932–33 parim. Arsenal võitis esimese divisjoni nelja punktiga. Samuti viskasid nad sel hooajal liigas klubirekordi 118 väravat. Arsenal võitis liiga ka järgmisel hooajal, lüües Huddersfield Towni teisele kohale. Selleks ajaks kasutas WM -i koosseisu enamik jalgpalliliiga klubisid.

Herbert Chapman oli üks väheseid mänedžere, kes hakkas enne mänge taktika otsustama. Jimmy Ruffell mängis West Ham Unitedis aastatel 1920–1937. Meeskonda juhtis Syd King, kuid ta väitis, et Charlie Paynter otsustas meeskonna taktika: "Syd King oli hea mänedžer. Kuid ta lahkus päevast palju -tänane värk meie treenerile Charlie Paynterile. See oli Charlie, kellega enamik rääkis millestki. Syd King tegeles rohkem tehingute tegemisega, et saada mängijad West Hami mängima. "

Sarnased kommentaarid tehti Joe Smithi kohta, kes juhtis Blackpooli aastatel 1935–1956. Stanley Matthews väitis, et Smith: "Kunagi ei olnud suurepärane või isegi mõistlik taktik, ta oli sellegipoolest parim mänedžer, kellele mul on kunagi olnud au mängida. Joe tõi minus esile parima, sest ta lubas mul mängida oma loomulikku mängu. Olen alati tänulik tema toetuse ja usu eest, eriti kui ma vaatan tagasi hetkedele, mil olukorrad mõtlesid mind endas ja oma võimekuses kahtlema ... Joe oli suurepärane psühholoog, kes suutis keskmise mängija uskuda ja esineda hea ja hea mängija väga hea mängijana. Ta sõlmis mõned väga head mängijad ja see on mänedžeri töö kõige raskem osa. Joe tegi seda ikka ja jälle. Nagu ma olen varem öelnud, pole mänedžeril et nad ütleksid headele mängijatele, mida teha, nad teavad. "

Cyril Robinson mängis 1953. aasta FA karikafinaalis Blackpooli eest Bolton Wanderersi vastu. Hiljem väitis ta, et enne mängu ütles kõik Smith, et "mine sinna ja löö nad ära". Stanley Matthewsi sõnul ütles ta: "Minge välja ja nautige end. Olge need mängijad, keda ma tean, ja meil on kõik korras."

Stan Mortensen mängis Blackpoolis ka Joe Smithi käe all. Ta tunnistas ka, et Smith veetis vähe aega taktikatest rääkides, jättes selle kapten Harry Johnsoni hooleks: "Joe'l on kõigi teiste seas silmapaistev suur voorus - ja neid on palju. Ta on jalgpallis kõige parem kaotaja ja võitja. Kui me võidame, ei ole ta kunagi õhus ega unista meistritiitelest; ja kui me kaotame, annab ta kiiresti lohutust ja ei jää kunagi suhu. Joe on mänginud nii kaua mängija ja mänedžerina, et teab Täiesti hästi, et üks kaotus ei tähenda väljalangemist, rohkem kui üks võit kuulutab karika- või liigavõitu. "

Šotimaal olles olin tutvunud Calthorpe'i jalgpalliklubiga, mis tuli üles ja mängis Queen's Parki teist meeskonda. Calthorpe'is oli väga õiglasi mängijaid ja otsustasin Birminghami saabudes nendega ühineda. Kuid üks mu töökaaslastest George Uzzell mainis mulle Aston Villa kui klubi, mis oli kiiresti esiplaanile tõusnud ja palus mul selle liikmeks saada. Ma kõhklesin mõnda aega, kuid lõpuks ütles mu sõber mulle, et "šoti vend" härra George Ramsay on Villa kapten ja see otsustas mind. Härra Ramsay oli Glasgow mees ja oli väga palju pingutanud, et tuua Villa meeskond esikohale. Ta oli ise hea parempoolne ründaja ja teda toetas hästi W. B. Mason. Nii et ma läksin härra Ramsay juurde ja me saime korraga headeks sõpradeks ja oleme seda siiani.

Härra Ramsay oli praktiliselt Aston Villa jalgpalliklubi asutaja. Ta oli Šotimaal olles mängus hea õppemaksu saanud ja Oxfordi klubi liikmena oli ta kogunud palju kogemusi ning osalenud mitmetes esmaklassilistes kohtumistes. Veidi aega enne lahkumist oli tema klubi Scotch Cupi eest kolm korda Glasgow Rangersiga viigistanud. Ta hoidis eesmärki ja jutustab, et viimasel korral päästis ta oma värava nina murdmise arvelt.

Härra Ramsay oli kõikvõimalik pealinna mängija ja võis asuda mis tahes positsioonile ning endast hästi aru anda. Birminghami tulles leidis ta siin jalgpalli väga mahajäänud olekus. Neli peamist klubi olid St. Mary's, Aston Unity, Calthorpe ja Birmingham. Ühel päeval nägi härra Ramsay, kuidas mõned poisid mängisid koos suure avaliku pargiga Park Road, Astoni ees ja ta vaatas neid uudishimu ja lõbustusega. Nad olid seotud Villa Cross Wesleyani kabeliga ja neil olid ainult mängu kõige primitiivsemad ideed. Ramsay kirjeldab nende mängu nagu "kriips mehele ja suur löök pallile"; nad ei teadnud dribblingut täielikult ja olid ilmselgelt teadmiste kõige algelisemas etapis - üsna "alaealised", nagu ütles härra Ramsay.

Noh, kui ta oli mõnda aega poisse jälginud, rääkis ta kõrvalseisjaga ja soovitas neil kahel mänguga liituda. Siis helistas ta ühele mängijale, nimega William Weissile, ja tegi ettepaneku, et tal lubataks ühel pool mängida ja teisel juhuslik tuttav. Kui tema laiast šotist oli pärast palju vaeva aru saadud, nõustuti ettepanekuga ja härra Ramsay hakkas mängima. Peagi näitas ta, et teadus oli kõigist nende suurtest löökidest parem ja tilgutas palli kergesti mööda mehi, kes polnud kunagi varem sellist väljapanekut näinud. Nad olid üllatunud, kui nägid, kuidas ta mängis ja kui kõik oli lõppenud, piirasid nad palli jalga pannud mängija ümber.

Tolleaegse Hunteri Ramsay mõju pani Villa arendama keeruka söötmismängu, mis oli revolutsiooniline samm inglise klubi jaoks 1870. aastate lõpus. See oli mängustiil, mille eeskujuks oli tol ajal Šotimaal levinud, tol ajal Šotimaal levinud ja mille rajaja oli Glasgow poolne Queen's Park. Seda tüüpi keerukat meeskonnatööd kasutati Inglismaal harva. Selle asemel prooviksid üksikisikud viia palli nii kaugele kui võimalik, kuni vastane selle peatab.

Reisisime Nottinghamist Birminghami ja hankisime koolituseks vajalikud rõivad ning läksime samal õhtul Droitwichi. Väljaspool jaama ootas meid pidur ja kottpimedal ööl sõitsime tosinat meist läbi vaiksete maalähedaste radade veidi harvemasse kohta Severni jõel nimega Holt Fleet.

Siia jõudsime keskööl ja olles päevastest pingutustest väsinud ja sõiduga unised, kukkusime voodisse. Hotellimajutus oli tol ajal Holt Fleetis piiratud iseloomuga ja võõrustaja polnud harjunud, et nii suured peod majutust palusid. Ta ei olnud meie jaoks valmis ja esimesel õhtul pidime seda karmima. Kuus meist magasid ülemisel pööningul, kuhu oli paigutatud kolm voodit. Ma ütlen, et me magasime, aga see pole päris õige. Meid pandi sinna magama, kuid öösel varitsev katk oli meile vastu.

Kõike seda muidugi parandas hiljem kohusetundlik võõrustaja, kes tegi kõik endast oleneva, et meil oleks mugav. Kuid te imestate, miks me selle koha oma eesmärgi nimel valisime. See ei olnud meie avastus, vaid seda soovitas meile meister-miilijooksja W. G. George. Tema kombeks oli treenides kõndida Bromsgrove'ist Droitwichi ja Holt Fleet asub nende kahe koha vahel. Linnaosa on sportlastele väga soodne. Seal on peen avatud ala ja jõgi, mis pakub kõiki võimalusi paadisõiduks ja ujumiseks. Siis on jalutuskäigud ümberringi veetlevad ja soolvee vannid Droitwichis on muidugi väga mugavad.

Kuna me seal olime, on teised jalgpallimeeskonnad oma eeliseid kogenud, eriti Wolverhampton Wanderers. Siin me jäime nädalaks oma treeneri Billy Gormani juurde. Ta oli kuulus sprindijooksja ja võitnud erilise puude; ja kui ta enam ei osalenud avalikel võistlustel, pühendus ta sportlaste treenimisele ja oli suur mees.

Tõusime igal hommikul kell kaheksa üles ja sõime hommikusööki. Pärast jalutasime umbes tund aega nii nagu soovisime. Seejärel panime me vormi selga ja luba, mille Lord Dudley ülevaataja lahkelt andis, lubati meil kasutada hotelli taga asuvat maapinda sprindijooksuks ja pikamaajooksuks. Oli uudishimulik jälgida erinevust, mis praktikas mõne inimese või meie füüsiliste võimete osas kiiresti tekkis. Seal oli näiteks Dennis Hodgetts, keda nimetati meie aeglaseks meheks. Kuni selle ajani puudus tal tõepoolest soovitud kiiruskvaliteet, mis on väljakul nii kasutatav. Kuid pärast seda treeningut arenes ta suurepäraselt üheks kiiremaks seeriaks ja teda hiilgas vaid Richard Davis (Walsall Swifti hilineja), kellel oli lühikeste distantside kiireima mängija maine. Kõik teised olid väga kiired: Albert Brown, Joey Simmonds, Jack Burton, Freddy Dawson, Howard Vaughton, Harry Yates ja Albert Allen, kuid sprindijooks parandas nende vormi tohutult.

Mis puudutab mind, siis läksin pikamaajooksule, meie väravavahi Warneriga, kellel polnud erilist vajadust sellel treeningul osaleda ja Coultonil, minu kaaslaste jaoks. Albert Allen, peaksin siinkohal selgitama, oli meie varumees, kes oli valmis Dawsoni koha vajadusel võtma, sest Freddy oli põlvele tõsiselt haiget teinud ja me olime väga ebakindlad, kas ta saab mängida. Kui aga õige aeg saabus, esitati küsimus kogu meeskonnale ja nad otsustasid, et ta on vormis, nii et Allenit polnud ju vaja.

Noh, nii see hommik läks. Mõnikord kõndis meeskond mööda veetlevaid radu kaheksa või kümme miili, vastutades ühe või kahe komitee liikme ja minu eest ning siis naasisime õhtusöögile.

Pärast õhtusööki lubati meil uuesti lõõgastuda ja seejärel kutsuti meeskond kokku jalgpallitrenni, kus härrasmees teisel pool jõge oli meie käsutusse andnud sobiva maapinna. Siin töötasime poolteist tundi kõvasti, täiustades end kogu mänguteaduses ja valdades kõiki trikke, mida välja mõelda suudeti. See oli sport, kuid me olime väga tõsised ja kuigi me nautisime, ei säästnud me pingutusi, et õppida kõike, mida õppida.

Tagasi tulles hõõrusime meid ja treener uuris neid ning istusime siis teed jooma. Pärast seda sööki jalutasime sageli poolteist kilomeetrit; ja igal õhtul kell kümme olid Villa meeskond voodis. Selline oli meie koolitus päevast päeva.

Hommikusöögiks oli meil sink ja munad või kala ning jõime teed või kohvi. Meil polnud lõunat, välja arvatud ehk klaas õlut, kui olime sellega harjunud. Õhtusöögiks oli meil kala, enamasti lõhe või näär. Sageli tõi meie võõrustaja meile värskelt püütud lõhe ja ühel või kahel korral nautisime ka kalapüügiretki. Mõnikord oli meil natuke röstitud veiseliha või lambaliha ja aeg -ajalt kanu; aga õhtusöögiks oli kõige sagedamini kala. Tee koosnes karbonaadist ja praedest ning läksime ilma õhtusöögita magama.

Loomulikult ei olnud iga päev sarnane ja meil olid väikesed seiklused, mis moodustasid rutiinile meeldiva variatsiooni. Meie eriline rõõm oli jõuda jõe ääres istuvale meie vanale hea treenerile, ritv käes, oodates kannatlikult kala, mida kunagi ei tulnud, samal ajal kui öösel ümbersuunamisest puudu ei tulnud. Padjalahingud olid tolle aja järjekorras ja kuna enamik meist oli linnaelu eelistega harjunud, oli täiesti loomulik, et püüdsime leida võimalikult palju lõbustust selles vaikses väljaspool maailma. Mõnel õhtul peeti meid hotellis meelelahutuseks maakonna humalakorjajatelt, kes teenisid ausa penni, riietusid end nagu punased indiaanlased, kleepisid suled mütsi, mustasid nägu ja esinesid igasuguste metsikutega. narrimine, tantsimine ja laulmine.

Tõeline taktika Olen nõus, et alustan riietusruumist, kui klubi ametnikud saavad mängijatele anda aimu vastase üldistest meetoditest, nõrkustest ja tugevusest. Just siis tehakse või tuleks teha mitte üks, vaid mitu plaani, et opositsiooni saaks rünnata selle kõige nõrgemas kohas ja uurida, kus kahtlustatakse muid nõrkusi.

Liikuvus on iga meeskonna edu saladus ja see tähendab, et kapten peaks saama igal hetkel oma plaani ümber lülitada mõnele teisele taktikalisele liikumisele, mille on arutanud ja kokku leppinud kõik meeskonnaliikmed.

Ma ei saa näiteks nõustuda, et üks eespool, rääkimata kahest, peab alati olema ründavate kolleegide taga. See pole alati võimalik. Olen nõus, et seni, kuni ülejäänud neli edenevad ja tulemusi annavad, saab meetodit jätkata, kuid kui tulemusi ei ole oodata, tuleb selle parandamiseks astuda samme ja see võib lõppeda kõigi viie edasirünnakuga .

Meeskonna taktikalised skeemid ja plaanid peavad alati olema sujuvad ning kapten ja tema meeskond peavad alati olema valmis neid sündmuste käigule vastu võtma. Kaitse liikumine rünnakule vastu astumiseks peab ise vastu astuma mõne teise skeemiga. Kogu aeg positiivne tegutsemine on parim poliitika, mida ükski meeskond võib järgida: energiline ja mitmekülgne rünnak on tee võidule. Negatiivne poliitika lüüasaamise vältimiseks, mida sageli rakendatakse, eriti võõrsil klubi poolt, ei ole õnnelik lahendus meeskonna probleemidele.

Arsenalil on eelmistel hooaegadel öeldud, et tal oli täiesti oma meetod ja ausalt öeldes ma ei usu seda hetkekski. Kui sageli olete kuulnud, et nad keskendusid pikkadeks aegadeks kaitsmisele, et oma vastased hästi välja tõmmata ja hei presto, pall vahetati ootamatult nende seni jõude ründajatele, kellel polnud siis muud teha kui kihutada ja pall võrku panna .

Vanas Arsenali meetodis oli rohkemgi. Olgu mõistetud, et nad olid staaride meeskond ja nende ründajad ei vajanud nii laia ruumi, et teha liikumist, mis tooks tulemusi. Paljud on Inglismaa esimese divisjoni kaitsjad, kes on end uimaseks ajanud, püüdes peatada Arsenali ründajaid sõnast "minema".

Mul pole seda, et Arsenali meetodid fikseeriti. Olen veendunud, et nende jaoks oli rohkem kui enamiku meeskondade puhul oluline just meeskonna voolavus ... kõigi mängijate täielik mõistmine, teadmine, et iga mees oleks teatud hetkel teatud kohas kuidas mäng kulges. Kirjutamise ajal on Arsenalil halb ilm; nad tõusevad uuesti.

Riietusruumi kõnelused ja arutelud on tõepoolest väga olulised. Mängijad võrdlevad varasema kogemuse märkmeid. Meeskonna agendid on ilmselt hiljutises mängus vastast jälginud. Kahju ei saa olla kahe ja kahe kokku panemisest ning vastuse saamisest plaani kujul, mis ilmselt opositsiooni üle kavaldab.

Kuid oleks vale kindlasti mängijatele öelda: "Nii mängite seda mängu; jääge plaani juurde." Võiks öelda: "See on tõenäoline viis hea alguse saamiseks, proovige seda mõnda aega ja kui tulemused on head, jätkake."

Meetod on selles, et kui kaptenil on õigus otsustada, kas see meetod on õige, kui ta näeb, kuidas see toimib. Peavad olema ooterežiimiplaanid ja ilmselt tuleb alati kaaluda arvamusi, mis on valmis ellu viima.

Syd King oli hea mänedžer. Syd King tegeles rohkem tehingute tegemisega, et saada mängijad West Hami eest mängima. Aga selles oli ta hea. Ta viis meid karikavõistluste finaali ja edendas West Hami 1923. aastal, nii et te ei saa paluda enamat.


Jalgpallitaktika põhitõed: selgitati 4-3-3 formatsiooni

4-3-3 on väljakul kolmes reas-tüüpiline kahe keskkaitsja ja kahe äärekaitsja kaitse, kolm keskkaitsjat, kes võivad moodustada kolmnurga ja kolm ründajat, üks keskkaitsja ja kaks mängijat küljed.

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Selle koosseisu võtmeks on laiad ründajad, kes külgnevad üksiku keskründajaga. Need mängijad on igakülgsed ründavad mängijad, kellel on tempo ja tulistamisvõime ning kes kasutavad oma kiirust äärel, enne kui nad värava poole lõikavad. Cristiano Ronaldo on suurepärane näide. Üksik ründaja ise võib olla võimas sihtmärgi mees või keegi, kes langeb sügavale, et kaitsjad eemale tõmmata ja jätta ruumi laiadele ründajatele, kuulsas Lionel Messi stiilis „Vale 9“.

Neid ründajaid aitavad vähemalt kaks keskkaitsjat. Need keskpoolkaitsjad moodustavad väljaku keskel tiheda kolmnurga ja satuvad sageli „looja-hävitaja-söötja“ rollidesse, et rünnata, kaitsta ja hoida oma valdust. Mõned poolkaitsjad ühendavad kõik need elemendid, kuid hästi tasakaalustatud keskväli on moodustamise võti.

Tänu kompaktsele keskväljale võivad ka äärekaitsjad rünnakuga liituda ja laiade ründajate kõrge positsioneerimise tõttu tohutult ruumi kasutada.

4-3-3 on vaieldamatult kõige potentsiaalselt ülekaalukam kõigist kaasaegsetest koosseisudest. Sellel on põhjus, miks paljud Euroopa jalgpalli domineerivamad küljed - Chelsea, Madridi Real, Barcelona - seda kasutavad. Need on pooled, kes ootavad iga nädal võitu ja piisavalt ründavat jõudu, et ületada pooled, kes on otsustanud lahkuda viigiga.

4-3-3 võimaldab valduses vähemalt 7 mängijal rünnata, sest laiaulatuslikud ründajad suruvad kaitset kokku, tagakaitsjad tõusevad nende taha ja kaks keskkaitsjat tungivad edasi.

Kuid hea 4-3-3 eriline kvaliteet on kägistav kvaliteet, mida see toob. See tuleneb kahe elemendi, kolme mehe keskvälja, mis saab kolmanda kolmnurga kaudu domineerida, ja kolme ründaja, kes suudavad platsi kõrgele suruda, ühendamisest. Vastastel on raske palli kätte saada ja seda hoida. Poolkaitsjad ei saa palli kätte ja neile avaldatakse kiiret survet. Kaitsjad seisavad silmitsi sellega, et kolm meest neid vajutavad ja kergeid palle tiibadele pole, kui äärekaitsjad üles suruvad.

Täielikult toimiv rünnak 4-3-3 on nagu tõusulaine liivakasti vastu-see võib võtta aega, kuid lõpuks murrab see kaitsest läbi. Ja pole kunagi olnud 4-3-3, mis toimiks paremini kui Barcelona pool 2008-09 Pep Guardiola juhtimisel oma esimesel hooajal, kolmikvõitjad, kes domineerisid Manchester Unitedit Meistrite liiga finaalis ja Madridi Reali liigas.

Tagatipuks on see, et 4-3-3, kes ei suuda palli rünnaku ajal hoida, on potentsiaalselt väga haavatav. Ainsad kaitsesse jäänud mängijad on keskkaitsjad ja kaitsev poolkaitsja. See tekitab leti ääres väga ohtliku olukorra, sest vastasmängijatel on piisavalt ruumi sissemurdmiseks. Kõik, mis on vähem kui tippkaitses poolkaitsja, kes on füüsiliselt tugev, omab suurepärast positsioneerimist, palju tempot ja täpseid sööte, võib keskkaitsjad väga paljastada. Üks valesti tehtud sööt ja vastasmeeskonnal on ohtlik loendur.

4-3-3 nõuab ka laiaulatuslikelt mängijatelt tohutut distsipliini. Võimalus paljastada, kui teil on laiaulatuslikud ründajad, kes ei suuda tagasi jõuda, on tohutu. Ründe toetuseks tormavatel äärekaitsjatel peab olema energiat 90 minutit tagasi sõita ja kaitsta. Vastasel juhul hakkavad vastased laiad mängijad ääremaal mässama.

Kuigi tänapäeval võib Paul Lamberti nimi olla Villa Parki ümber muda, oli aeg, mil Villans oli külje tuleviku suhtes optimistlik. See tunne oli kõige tugevam hooaja 2012-13 lõpus, kui Abgonlahori, Benteke ja Weimanni täisrünnak ründas Villa väljalangemistsoonist välja. Tipphetk oli 6: 1 võit Sunderlandi üle.

Kahjuks, peale selle esikolmiku, polnud tõesti materjali stabiilse meeskonna loomiseks, kus oleks Yacouba Syllas ja Karim El-Ahmadis soodsad kaitsvad poolkaitsjad ning jätkuv kvaliteetne tagamängija. See probleem jätkus ka sel hooajal, kus kaks kaotust Arsenali vastu ja Carlos Sánchezi kokkupuude näitasid 4-3-3 haavatavust puuduliku pressimise ja kaitsva keskkaitsja puudumise tõttu.

4-3-3 ja Villa kohe

Tim Sherwood ei ole näidanud üles suurt kalduvust kasutada 4-3-3, näiliselt eelistades kas Benteke'i üksiku ründajana või paaris Abgonlahoriga ning Andi Weimann jäi suuresti pingile. Seda kasutati ainult esimeses FA Cupi mängus West Bromi vastu, kui Scott Sinclairist ja Charles N'Zogbiast tehti Gabby Abgonlahori mõlemal küljel hädavajalikud ründajad ja peaaegu läbi suruti.

Kaitsemehe ja kaitsva poolkaitsja võtmepositsioonid on sellel Villa poolel veel välja töötamisel, nii et tõenäoliselt ei näe me seda koosseisu Claretis ja Blue'is niipea.

Rohkem artikleid sarjas 7500toHolte Football Tactics Basics leiate siit:


Väliskaitsjate ajalooline kasutamine

Esimesed 90 aastat taktikat järgisid ühist taktikalist ülesehitust: kõrged sihtmärgid üle ründeliini ja ülejäänud mängijad võtsid keskelt ära. Nagu Wilson märgib, oli jalgpall algusaegadel väga individuaalne. Kritsimisvõime oli suurepärase mängija tunnus ja füüsiline lähenemine võrdsustati sitkusega. Varased kaotused inglastele viisid Šotimaa mängu söödu poolele, kuid mõlemad lähenemised mahtusid 2-3-5 püramiidi moodustisse.

Nagu näete alloleval pildil, võimaldas püramiidi põhistruktuur rünnakul suuremat laiust, kaitstes samal ajal keskvasturünnakute eest. Osavad ründajad olid kaetud poolkaitsjate või poolkaitsjatega. Kuna valdus kadus ja meeskonnad asusid kaitsekolmandikku, ühinesid keskkaitsjad äärekaitsjatega, et arvuliselt arvestada opositsiooni ründajatega.

1920. aastatel tutvustas W-M formatsiooni legendaarne treener Herbert Chapman. Variatsioonina 2-3-5, W-M kihitas edasijoone, lisades keskse domineerimise ja kolmnurga elemendi. See 2-3-3-2 tagas valduse kaotamise, mille tulemusena pidi opositsioon teise kaitseliini puhastama. Chapman on tuntud selle poolest, et asetab tulemused stiililt kõrgemale, nii et kuigi see taktika areng oli rohkem pragmaatiline ja kaitsvalt kõlav, käivitab see spordile kaitsvama, pragmaatilisema, tulemustel põhineva lähenemisviisi, mis jätkub veel mitu aastakümmet. üks. Edusammud hõlmasid kaitsjate tugevuse tagamiseks ühte ja seejärel teist keskkaitsjat.

Tegelikult liikusid pärast M-M paljud meeskonnad 4-2-4 suunas. Ajalooliselt oli see järgmine suurem taktika areng. Keskkaitsja asus nüüd ründajatele varem määratud rollidele, muutes keskkaitsjad täielikult tagasi. Olenemata sellest, kas keskkaitsjad olid tasased või pühkija/korkide joonduses, nähti mineviku äärekaitsjaid pigem kaitsekattena.

Moodsa väliskaitsja otsimisel analüüsisin mitmeid ajaloolisi vasteid. Kõigi aegade parimate nimekirjade teinud tagakaitsjate uurimine viis mind järgmistesse mängudesse.

  • Inter Milan vs Celtic (25. mai 1967)
  • Brasiilia vs Itaalia (21. juuni 1970)
  • Ajax vs Juventus (30. mai 1973)
  • Itaalia vs Brasiilia (5. juuli 1982)
  • AC Milan vs Real Madrid (19. aprill 1989)
  • AC Milan vs Barcelona (18. mai 1994)

Kui Cruyffi Ajax välja arvata, oli neil kolmel esimesel matšil vähe vahetusi, valides taktikaliselt jäigema lähenemise. Kuigi 1970ndate Brasiilia ja Ajaxi meeskonnad olid oma ajast tublisti ees, oli selge, et need olid revolutsiooni alguspäevad. Joone katkestused, positsiooniline triangulatsioon ja intensiivne vajutamine olid nende lähenemise aluseks. Lisaks nägi Brasiilia Carlos Alberto ja Everaldo kasutamine, et äärekaitsjad võtavad rünnakukohustused kõrgel väljakul.

Väliskaitsjate ründamise edu tõi kaasa paradigma muutuse. Selle asemel, et sundida loovisikuid ülekoormatud keskväljadele, kasutasid meeskonnad väliskaitsjaid peaaegu täiendava poolkaitsjana. Mängu arenedes osalesid ründes rohkem tagakaitsjad, andes meile selliseid mängijaid nagu Roberto Carlos, Javier Zanetti, Philipp Lahm, Dani Alves ja Marcelo. Nüüd oleme tunnistajaks järjekordsele progressile, mis on tõesti naasmine meie jalgpallijuurte juurde.

Michelsi ja Cruyffi totaalvoetbalmist inspireerituna viitavad Barcelona Juego de Posición ja Ajaxi uuendamine evolutsioonilisele arengule jalgpalli ründamisel. Cruyffi Petri tasside, Ajaxi ja Barcelona järel näeme, kuidas tema õpilased ja nende otsesed rivaalid kohandavad püramiidi 2-3-5 põhilisi taktikalisi põhimõtteid tänapäevase mänguga. Olles saanud põhiteadmised püramiidi ajaloost ja kaasaegsete väliskaitsjate arengust, on aeg vaadata tähelepanelikult täna mängivate 2-3-5 ilminguid ja variatsioone. Selle asemel, et anda ülevaade igast meeskonnast, uurime taktikalist teooriat, mis juhib seda uut püramiidi rakendust, tutvustades mõnda maailma juhtivat meeskonda ja märkides mõningaid taktikalisi nüansse, mis eristavad klubisid.


Brasiilia, 1970 ja ajaloo kauneim jalgpall

Ootamispall ei taha nähtusi. On olnud fenomenaalseid mängijaid, fenomenaalseid trikke, väravaid, sööte, mänge ja#8211 oleme seda kõike näinud. Fenomenaalsed meeskonnad on kogu ajaloo vältel staadione pakkinud, jättes tuhandeid (ja miljoneid häälestavaid) masse oma aukartuse ees. Olgu see näiv, elastico või keskringi värav, ei suuda need peaaegu fantaasiarikkad kangelased harva üllatada.

Kuid kui fännid jätkuvalt oma ebajumalaid superlatiividesse mässivad, kui muidu sobivad autoritasudeks, kui mitte jumalad ise, on olemas pretsedent, mis alandab sellist jalgpallimogulit: 1970. aasta legendaarne Brasiilia pool.

Kaheksa aastat varem tähistas Brasiilia Estadio Nacionalil Tšiilis Santiagos Brasiilias oma teist järjestikust maailmameistrivõistlust, kui alistas finaalis Tšehhoslovakkia 3: 1. Pidustused ei jäänud mitmeks päevaks pensionile ning staarmehed Garrincha ja Pelé, hoolimata sellest, et viimane jäi vigastuste tõttu suurema osa turniirist ilma, kuulutati nüüd rahvusikoonideks. Ekstaas põles eredalt läbi. Tänavatel toimunud festivalid olid alistunud tolle aja süngemale tegelikkusele.

1961. aastal asus João Goulart paljude segaduste keskel Brasiilias presidendi ametisse. Ta oli varem asepresident, kuid kui praegune juht Jânio Quadros presidendiametist tagasi astus, edutati Goulart riigi juhtima. Tema hilisemad reformid polariseerisid avalikkust suuresti.

Goulart soovis teatud tööstusharusid riigistada, et luua tugevam sisemajandus ja vähendada majanduslikku lõhet Brasiilia ja USA vahel. Kartes, et reformid olid esimesed sammud kommunistliku blokiga ühinemiseks, võtsid paljud brasiillased ja parlament oma toetuse tagasi. Mõjutajad nimetasid ta kommunistiks ja kutsusid üles riigipöördeks.

1. aprillil 1964, kui mässuliste väed olid juba Rio de Janeiros, mõtles Goulart säästa kodusõja vaeva ja põgenes Uruguaysse. Kümne päeva pärast valiti Kongressi presidendiks Brasiilia armee staabiülem marssal Castelo Branco.

Riigipööre tõrjus Goularti ja tema vastuolulised reformid Brasiilia kasuks, kuid viis need veelgi sügavamasse poliitilisse segadusse. Castelo Branco laiendas oluliselt presidendi volitusi. Iga ametisolev ametnik võib nüüd muuta põhiseadust oma maitse järgi ja vallandada kõik poliitilised tegelased. Branco järeltulija kindral Artur da Costa e Silva allkirjastas uue akti, mis saatis Kongressi tõhusalt laiali, jõustas tsensuuri ja suurendas veelgi presidendi volitusi võrdsustada diktaatori omaga. Costa e Silva asendas kindral Emílio Garrastazú Médici, kuna ei saanud oma tervise tõttu ülejäänud ametiaega täita.

Ametisse astudes 1969. aastal võttis Médici südamest omaks Brasiilia sõjaväerežiimi loosungi “Brasil: ame-o ou deixe-o ”(Brasiilia: armasta seda või jäta see). Pärast aastaid kestnud kasvavat inflatsiooni, aeglast majanduskasvu ja sotsiaalseid rahutusi püüdis Médici muuta kliimat, kui ta seda sobivaks pidas. Tema ametiajal valitsesid repressioonid ja piinamised. Ajakirjanikke tsenseeriti tugevalt ja teisitimõtlejad, valesüüdistusega või mitte, vangistati ilma kohtuta. Kui öelda, et Médici diktatuuri ajal valitses sotsiaalne rahutus, oleks see parim viis selle väljendamiseks. To quell the masses, Médici found his alternative bread and circuses: football.

No political regime is wholly supported by its populace. Brazilians, however, revere the national team. To some locals, football means life. To many others, it means much, much more. Médici wanted his government to be seen in tandem with the national team – footballing success would mean political success. It was a means of controlling the discontent mob, but his heavy involvement in football was rather forced nor welcome.

He sanctioned the building of numerous new stadiums throughout the nation. High on personal pride, Médici continued to interfere directly with the sport, commandeering team selection at Flamengo before attempting to do the same with the Seleção. Although the propaganda effectively screened his regime’s atrocities, there was a tad bit more resistance than Médici had grown used to.

With the 1970 World Cup mere months away, Brazil were looking promising. They had won all their games in the qualifying rounds despite the manager, João Saldanha, failing to accommodate all the star names in his line-up. Most controversially and to much of Brazil’s dismay, Saldanha saw no logic in starting both of Brazil’s deadliest attackers, Pelé and Tostão (humorously nicknamed the ‘White Pelé’). He also neglected Rivellino and Médici’s personal favourite striker, Dario. Médici voiced his desire to see Dario involved in the team, to which Saldanha allegedly replied, “I do not mess with his cabinet, he will not mess with my team.”

Unsurprisingly, Médici fired Saldanha. He was replaced by a member of Brazil’s 1958 and 1962 World Cup winning squads, Mário Zagallo . Médici subsequently took a step back from the inner dealings of the Seleção, opting to propagate from afar in lieu of man management. Brazil, living pessimistically enough, had now lost all hope for their national team as well, while Zagallo quietly went about his ways.

Zagallo had one main initiative: to field Brazil’s best under one tactic. Brazil had a plethora of number 10s – Rivellino, a slick dribbler with an atomic left foot, Jairzinho, a fast dribbler with the strength and incision to pass any man, Gérson, a midfield maestro with the passing range to hit any tree, and the aforementioned Pelé and Tostão. Zagallo used the 4-2-4 formation Brazil played at the 1962 World Cup as the blueprint tactic for this team.

In goal stood Félix, Carlos Alberto – the captain of the side – Piazza, Brito and Everaldo made up the back four, Clodoaldo and Gérson operated as the midfield pivot, Jairzinho and Rivellino occupied the right and left flanks respectively, and Pelé and Tostão were the striking partnership. There were, however, a number of tactical tweaks.

Pelé played slightly deeper than Tostão. He was the pivotal playmaker, the closest to a classic number 10. Tostão, wearing the famous number 9, resembled more of a false 9. He roamed across the front line, often dropping deep to contribute to the build-up play and destabilise the opponent’s defence. With the centre-backs following Tostão’s runs, space would be created for Pelé or Jairzinho, the latter cutting inside from the right.

Rivelino was a more unorthodox winger. He would drift into the centre, consequently creating a three-man midfield with Clodoaldo and Gérson, or taking up more attacking positions near Pelé. Carlos Alberto was instructed to bomb down the right flank when Brazil were in possession, leaving Piazza, Brito and Everaldo to cover for the whole team. Piazza was actually a midfielder Zagallo insisted on him playing in defence to help with Brazil’s build-up play.

It is easy to forget that such tactical tweaks were radical innovations at the time. In terms of tactics and team identity, not much existed beyond the Catenaccio of the Italians – a rather new tactic within itself. Tostão’s false 9 runs were first introduced just a bit more than a decade prior, when the Hungarians humbled the English 6-3 in 1953. But Brazil did not adopt an identity from Zagallo’s tactics – those were mere instructions. The Seleção played with Brazil’s ever-present joga bonito mentality. The zest to ‘play beautifully’ is far more accredited to Saldanha. “Brazilian football,” Saldanha believed, “is a thing played to music.”

This samba rhythm did not stem from any vast technical or athletic superiority, rather the expressive art of capoeira. Cruelly exploited under the governing regime, Brazilian slaves developed this dance-martial arts hybrid. Capoeira focused on free bodily movement, which the slaves were otherwise denied. It was the perfect antithesis. Each practitioner, finally able to freely express, felt euphoric.

Capoeira became a tool of resistance – a dance, a movement that liberated one from the ails of the oppressing society. And in the 1930s, when black Brazilian players no longer had to powder their faces just to play football, this resistance-through-expression mentality truly became joga bonito.

Thus, with mere weeks to go until the World Cup in Mexico, a sudden managerial change, and a nation suffering under oppression once more, meant the capoeira mentality held more prevalence than ever. Brazil looked to their 23 travelling players for some sort of escape. Few fans, albeit reluctantly, rooted against the Seleção, hoping their shortcomings would embarrass Médici enough to leave office. But to the nation as a whole, Zagallo’s men were to be an indicator of the future – if Pelé and co could succeed in such times, then Brazil could too. Luckily, they were enchanting.

Drawn in a group against the world champions, England, the European champions, Czechoslovakia, and Europe’s newest sensation, Romania, Brazil’s chances were rated slim. Just four years prior, Portugal knocked Brazil out of the 1966 World Cup, evidently showing that Brazil could not cope with the European physicality.

It was on 3 June in Guadalajara, Mexico that Brazil faced Czechoslovakia in their opener of the World Cup. Televised to the entire world in colour for the very first time, everyone tensely watched on. Pelé, absent from this same fixture in the final of the 1962 World Cup, kicked the game off. Ja nii, Seleção dazzled as the world marvelled.

Brazil moved fast. They did not focus on hogging the ball nor defending deep. When in possession, they would swiftly play out the back and look for vertical passes to their attacking quartet. In truth, the team could play a myriad of styles but focused on quick combination play and instinctive movement. Pelé would often dummy the ball, leaving the pass for Tostão and continuing his own run into the box. Rivellino would fool opponents with his trickery, whilst Jairzinho posed a direct threat on the right. The world, seeing such sharp movements and trickery for the first time, could not help but watch.

Czechoslovakia scored first, but Rivellino soon equalised with a thunderous free-kick. Before half-time, Pelé audaciously attempted a shot from the centre circle. He missed by centimetres, but the crowd cheered as loud as ever. Brazil looked to be even stronger after the break, with Pelé nonchalantly finishing a team move. Gérson soon found Jairzinho with an over-the-top pass, and the number 7 thumped the ball into the net. The Brazilian joga bonito was on display from the very start but, despite winning 4-1, there was cause for concern. Gérson had gotten injured.

Gérson tied all strings together. His orchestration helped the team gel. Brazil felt confident to play the quick and simple passes around and through Gérson. But he was out until the remainder of the group stage, and a difficult game against England beckoned. The game was decisive. The winner would likely top the group and play in Guadalajara until the final, in lieu of Mexico’s more demanding altitudes.

Gérson’s absence was strongly felt. Brazil struggled to pass the ball around as effortlessly as before. The attacking quartet now faced the challenge of breaking down Bobby Moore’s solid defence. Carlos Alberto in his later years admitted that it was the hardest game of the whole tournament – but a game Brazil nonetheless won.

They managed to bypass England’s defence a number of times but met great resistance in Gordon Banks. In what looked a sure goal, Brazil went from their own third to the six-yard box in two passes and four touches, but Banks’s stretching arm miraculously kept out Pelé’s header in what many refer to as the save of the century. Eventually, when outnumbered six to three in England’s own penalty box, Tostão found Pelé with a cross, who laid it off to Jairzinho for the winger’s second goal in as many games. It was a physical, demanding game but Brazil had passed their hardest test without their most crucial cog. Qualification was now guaranteed.

In their final group stage game against Romania, joga bonito was a different animal. Still without Gérson and with Rivellino rested, Brazil wanted to ensure their victory early on. They carved holes in the Romanian defence. Pelé and Jairzinho put Brazil 2-0 in a blitz before even half an hour was played. The Romanian goalkeeper, Stere Adamache, was even subbed off for someone fresher and more confident. But Brazil’s lax defensive structure and insistence on playing out the back was proving problematic, as Romania soon capitalised on a misplaced pass.

After half-time, Pelé restored the two-goal lead with a predatory finish from inside the box. The ball had gotten there after an inventive flick from Tostão. Brazil was expressing itself and coasting, the world riveted by their football. Hope was trickling its way back into Brazilian life.

In the quarter-finals, Brazil faced their first South American opponents, Peru. Gérson and Rivellino had returned to the side. With Guadalajara watching, Brazil proved that in football, greatness and flexibility are synonymous. For 90 minutes, they did everything. They could create chances in all forms, be it a short corner, a pass over the defence, overlapping runs from the full-backs – Brazil terrorised Peru with undefendable flicks and tricks.

Rivellino scored the first with a deft, powerful finish to the bottom corner from the edge of the box. Tostão scored the second after a short one-two from the corner with Rivellino and a near-post finish. With a simple tap into an open net after Pelé had chipped the ball over the onrushing keeper, Tostão scored another. To cap off the spectacle, Jairzinho rounded the Peruvian goalkeeper and slotted the fourth into an empty net. The game finished 4-2 but the two Peruvian goals were more flukish than anything.

Such was the gusto that the Seleção felt for football, they simply wanted to play, to entertain, and to do so together. From their carefree attitude stemmed their tactical flexibility. Where the Europeans would position their players with meticulous instruction, Zagallo would license them to freely roam. No player in Brazil’s attacking quartet, bar Jairzinho, had a defined position.

Tostão, in lieu of leading the line, could either drop deep to join the midfield or pick up the ball on the left wing. When one player would leave his position, another would compensate. In the absence of a leading man, Pelé would push forward becoming the sole focal point of the attack. In such times, Rivellino would adopt the mantle of having dictatorial freedom in the centre. He could accompany Gérson in the midfield pivot, link up with Jairzinho on the right, or play right underneath the striker – be it Tostão or Pelé.

Such free movement greatly destabilised Brazil’s opponents. What was the right-back to do if Rivelino is casually strolling on the other flank? How were the centre-backs to react of Tostão was playing in midfield? Follow him out of position and you leave free space for Pelé to exploit. In a game of little options and no leeway, Brazil’s opponents could just watch. As these 11 spectators trembled in fear, millions of others gasped at the canary shirts wreaking havoc on their televisions. Hitherto the semi-finals, it seemed little could object Brazil’s free-flowing, attacking football.

South American rivalries are a fiery bunch. Each nation takes great pride in its footballing achievements. The fans, holding little direct influence on any result, succumb to two chief vices: pessimism and hyperbole.

Brazil were to face Uruguay in the semi-finals. Such a fixture had been played out once before at the World Cup, in the final of the 1950 edition. Uruguay had won that game, and at Brazil’s iconic Maracaña. Naturally, Brazilian fans were expecting a repeat. There was little cause to feel hopeful or optimistic about Brazil’s future in any regard given the ongoing political crisis. Many thought that nothing would go their nation’s way. Their fears were soon realised.

Uruguay had started the semi-final on the front foot. In a tactical tweak of their own, Uruguay assigned players to shadow Pelé and Gérson’s every movement. Pelé could shake his marker off easily, but with Gérson rarely in free space, Brazil suffered. A free-roaming tactic could only be applied on the basis of a vital, anchoring cog.

The same players that tormented defences all summer could no longer find one another with a pass. Uruguay, as aggressive as ever, seized their chance. They took an early 1-0 lead as the ball rolled slowly past the planted feet of the non-reacting Félix – a man embodying a nation. With time, however, Brazil grew into the game.

Their moves were penetrative, but Uruguay still looked unlikely to concede. But Gérson’s influence on a football match came in many forms. With half-time looming, he told Everaldo to start making attacking runs from deep. It only took the left-back one try. He ran into the penalty box and volleyed in Tostão’s cross. It was Brazil’s most crucial goal of the tournament. Now tied at 1-1, they knew that in the second half Uruguay would have to eventually open up to score. It was no longer a game of catch up.

The second half saw a different Brazil, a hungrier Brazil. Pelé was the first to come tantalisingly close. A dangerous diagonal pass on the edge of the penalty box called for two takers, Pelé and the onrushing Uruguay goalkeeper. With the latter at full stretch, Pelé let the ball roll, escaping him and Mazurkiewicz. Now alone in the penalty box with only one Uruguayan defender on the goal line, Pelé ran onto the loose ball but unfortunately shot it wide in the most iconic goal that never was. It was a taste of what was to come from Brazil.

Jairzinho turned the game. Tostão, from deep, played him a wonderful pass that left the Brazilian with one defender and the goalkeeper in his sight. He outpaced his man and slotted the ball into the bottom corner. Rivelino then secured the 3-1 victory with yet another strike from the edge of the box. The Seleção had laid Brazil’s fears to rest. The past was to hold no bearing on the present. A country at its lowest point and facing an opponent to whom it felt inferior to most, was now en route to the World Cup final. Life in Brazil no longer felt so dire.

June 21 saw a mouthwatering clash at the Estadio Azteca as Brazil’s joga bonito took on Italy’s catenaccio. Free, attacking football took on defensively astute, ruthless counter-attacking football. Zagallo expected the Italians to man-mark his players as the Uruguayans did before. To counter their measure, he instructed his men to keep possession and constantly pass the ball around to exhaust the Italians. It worked to perfection.

Throughout the game, Rivellino continuously moved central, with his marker following suit. Brazil focused on keeping the ball in areas where their players were in the numerical superiority. Clodoaldo, Gérson, Rivellino, Pelé and Tostão kept it circulating in the centre, essentially playing cat and mouse with the blue shirts. The aim was to draw out as many Italian markers from their defensive shape as possible, and then exploit the open spaces. But Brazil were rarely one dimensional.

Their first goal came from a throw-in. Taken short to Rivellino, he lofted it into the air towards Pelé. Brazil’s star man out-jumped his defender and headed the ball into the net, aptly scoring Brazil’s 100th goal in World Cup competitions. Brazil’s insistence on keeping possession and playing out the back once more cost them dear. The Italians capitalised on a misplaced pass within Brazil’s own defensive third and equalised before half-time.

After the break, Brazil didn’t change their approach instead, they upped a gear. Their passing now swifter and more purposeful, clear-cut chances were still hard to come by, but the Italians were growing shaky. Brazil had penned them into their own penalty box and two Italians markers would step out of line to greet any approaching Brazilian.

Jairzinho tried dribbling his way through. Losing out in a tackle, the ball landed to Gérson. He shuffled it slightly to the left, fired through the minuscule gap in Italy’s defence and into the net. Brazil had retaken the lead and Italy were forced to start pushing higher up the pitch.

Brazil had altered their tactics accordingly. Still circulating possession, they now searched for direct passes to its attacking quartet through the Italian lines of press. Such a ball was lofted from the middle third towards Pelé in the penalty box. He cushioned it down into Jairzinho’s path and the powerful winger scored his seventh goal of the World Cup.

The final was Brazil’s spectacle. Winning 3-1 and radiating confidence, Brazil kept the ball circulating as the Italians laboured behind. It came to Rivellino’s feet at the left corner of the penalty box. One Italian defender stood right ahead with another immediately behind. Rivellino stood his man up, and with the ball at his left foot, performed the elastico in one swift motion. The ball had went through Bertini’s legs and out again so cleanly it had to be magic. The world, seeing the trick for the very first time, could but marvel. The stadium now roaring, “Brazil! Brazil! Brazil!”. One more act of artistry was on its way.

The play started in Brazil’s own third. Tostão had chased the ball all the way back from attack. The final whistle now minutes away, Brazil pinged a few short passes together. The ball came to Clodoaldo’s feet and a screen of four blue shirts stood ahead. With a myriad of step-overs, his long legs tipped and toed their way through each oncoming challenge before passing the ball to Rivellino deep on the left flank.

Still in his own half, Rivelino played a long vertical pass to Jairzinho. The Italians were now heavily concentrated on the left, trying to dispossess the powerful winger. He passed the ball across the pitch to Pelé, who stood at the crown of the penalty box. The Italians, dazed and yet to catch up, could only watch. Pelé rolled the ball into the path of Carlos Alberto. The right flank of the pitch was entirely free. The right-back had galloped from defence into the Italian box and struck a first-time rocket to seal off a 4-1 win. The move encapsulated Brazil’s legendary football of 1970.

It was a team that made grown adults gawk. One that could do it all and make it look so effortless. But when a team that played a mere six games nearly half a century ago is considered the greatest of them all, any rational cynic would disregard the notion as romanticism. Brazil won all its plaudits on merit. It was the first nation to win all its games at the World Cup the first to have a player, Jairzinho, score in each game and the first nation to become a three-time world champion. Brazil did it in first-class style.

When Zagallo was appointed manager, he later admitted, he did not have to do much. The players had a perfect understanding and each was capable of winning matches single-handedly. Zagallo merely fixed the tactics and physically prepared them for Mexico’s high altitudes. Their brilliance was innate. None of the Brazilian players were playing in Europe and were largely unknown. As a result, when the world tuned in to see the famous yellow shirt and short blue shorts donned by 11 strangers, it fell in love for many a reason.

It was their story: an oppressive dictator presiding over a country in peril and a team gunning for glory to salvage some form of happiness for its despairing countrymen. It was their players: strong, fast, skilled, each capable of inventing a priorly unseen moment of magic. It was their football: quick, imaginative, and full of flair, Brazil set the precedent for a fluid and potent offence. See oli joga bonito – the zest to play beautifully.


Total Football: A graphic history of the world's most iconic soccer tactics

The striking evolution of the world's most iconic football tactics: How they work, why they win - and the people that made them iconic. In the early days of football, it was simple: a goalkeeper, two defenders and the rest attacked. Now the game is all about strategy.

Innovative graphics and expert analyses guide you through the managers' decisions that led to new formations, the pure talent of footballers that defined each playing style, and the matches that propelled the winning tactics to legendary status. Sanjeev Shetty explores how each tactic works and the ways in which it guaranteed victory time and time again. From catenaccio to tiki taka, Pele to Messi and Cruyff to Guardiola, Total Football gives you a new understanding of how the beautiful game is played.

Sanjeev Shetty is a sports journalist with nearly twenty years' experience. He works for the BBC as a producer and reporter on their international services covering their sports news channels. Tema on autor No Middle Ground ja Messigraphica. Sanj lives in Cheshire, UK with his family.


Football Tactics basics: The 4-4-2 formation explained

As 7500 to Holte's resident tactics obsessive, a guide to some of the formations and tactical concepts that I talk about each week may help. So this is the first of a series of tactical guides I'll be writing to explain some of those fundamentals.

This week we're starting with a guide to a formation, that English classic, the 4-4-2. It's characterised by four defenders (two centre-backs in the middle, full-backs on the left and right sides), four midfielders (two central midfielders, two wingers on the left and right sides) and two strikers. This is the ‘open' or ‘flat' 4-4-2 in which the midfielders are not placed in a narrow diamond shape but spread out in a line.

Image from soccer-training-guide.com

The chief benefit of the 4-4-2 is its simplicity. It provides a solid basic structure with defensive depth and attacking numbers, with clearly marked roles. Many English players have grown up playing this formation their entire lives and define their position as a defender, midfielder or striker due to its influence.

Without the ball, the four defenders and four midfielders can put eight men in front of the opposition, covering the entire width of the field. If the defence pushes up high with the midfield, the opposition can be strangled in their own half by a wall of players. With the ball, there are always options out wide and a strong presence up front to provide attacking options via long balls or crosses.

The real danger of the 4-4-2 is a pair of strikers who understand each other's game. The common example is a ‘big man-little man' combo, where a big striker is the target man for long balls and crosses, ready to knock the ball behind the defence or down into the box for his partner to latch onto. Christian Benteke and Gabby Abgonlahor have played this way for Aston Villa this season. But such combinations can exist between many different types of strikers. The best example in recent years was under Alex Ferguson at Manchester United in Andy Cole and the former Villa man Dwight Yorke - two good strikers who became terrifying when put together and drove United to their 1998-99 Treble.

The downside of the 4-4-2 is that its rigid positions can lead to a side being swamped by more flexible opponents. The obvious potential weakness is that by playing with two strikers you can be outnumbered in midfield. While one striker may be tasked with dropping back to help out, many strikers are not disciplined enough to do so effectively. If the wingers also prefer playing out by the sidelines of the pitch, the central midfielders can quickly be isolated against teams playing three or even four central midfielders.

That rigidity is caused by the 4-4-2's three lines of players which can allow opposition players to find pockets of space ‘between the lines', especially defence and midfield. A well-disciplined team will compress the space between defence and midfield so as to avoid this, but a poorly organized 4-4-2 can leave huge amounts of space in front of the defence and if the midfield cannot close down the passing lanes, teams can be ripped apart by opposition players lurking in those spaces.

Martin O'Neill´s Aston Villa

The example that most Villa fans will remember is under Martin O'Neill from 2007-2010. The key components of his 4-4-2 were the strikers and the wingers. Up front, Gabby Abgonlahor was paired with a big target man in the form of either John Carew or Emile Heskey. Width was provided by the team's standout performer Ashley Young and James Milner or Stewart Downing .

O'Neill also used powerful aerial centre-backs, either the outstanding Martin Laursen and Olof Mellberg or James Collins and Richard Dunne. The key central midfielders of his tenure were Gareth Barry and Stiliyan Petrov , with Milner also sometimes playing in the middle.

This video of a 5-1 win against Bolton shows the shape of the Villa attack, balls flying in from the wings towards John Carew, supported by Gabby Abgonlahor. The reason this team was elevated beyond a typical 4-4-2 was the quality and versatility of Ashley Young and James Milner. Starting on the left wing, Ashley Young could cross with either foot, or cut in and score and was given complete freedom to switch wings as he wished -a winger on both sides of the pitch and a third striker at the same time. Milner was even more flexible, a winger, a third striker and a fine central midfielder as well.

Young and Milner's versatility led an overwhelming Villa counter-attack which overrode the possible defensive weaknesses of the formation itself and O'Neill's lack of a really good defensive midfielder or top full-backs - except occasionally such as the 7-1 loss to Chelsea.

The 4-4-2 and Villa right now

The 4-4-2 is very relevant at Villa right now due to Tim Sherwood taking over. Paul Lambert rarely used it, but it became strongly linked with Sherwood during his time at Tottenham when he brought Emmanuel Adebayor back into the team as a target man striker and got him scoring goals via this formation - though he insisted that "I don't know what you are saying about 4-4-2" when it was blamed for an FA Cup loss to Arsenal.

During his time at Villa we've seen this type of open 4-4-2 a few times - first in the glorious 4-0 win over Sunderland (which I analysed here if you want to relive it) but also in the losses against Swansea and Manchester United (analysis here and here for the more morbid). Sherwood has looked to use Benteke and Abgonlahor as a big man-little man pair and the pace of N'Zogbia and Sinclair on the wings, with the full-backs also given freedom to come up the field, especially Bacuna.

Against Sunderland it was hugely successful, their defenders unable to cope with the pace of the attack. However Swansea and Manchester United both used their superior numbers in midfield to dominate the game. Since then Sherwood has experimented instead with the ‘diamond' in midfield. We're unlikely to see the flat 4-4-2 again until Abgonlahor is fully fit, to reform the crucial striking partnership, but while good strikers and wingers are available, the 4-4-2 will always be an option when the side needs goals fast.

More articles in the 7500toHolte Football Tactics Basics series can be found here:


The Long Ball Game

This is a tactic which is often sneered at. Not particularly pleasing on the eye and requiring less of the more respected technical skills required, defensive-minded teams are often the ones who adopt a long ball strategy.

In essence, the idea of playing the long ball game is to send the ball forward from deep positions in the air towards a striker who takes the ball down and begins an attack.

To play this tactic successfully, the forward players need to be strong, capable of holding up the ball and good in the air. The long ball can also be used to play the ball into space for a fast attacking player to latch on to. You'll also need a couple of outstanding attacking midfielders who have the ability to join the attack and ensure the striker doesn't become isolated.

Long ball teams are often defensively minded in their approach. Their intention is get the ball as far away from their goal as possible, using physical players up top to dominate the opposition in the air.

Long ball football is often criticised as being ugly but it can produce moments of brilliance. Dennis Bergkamp’s goal for Holland against Argentina is replayed time and time again, as being one of the best in the 1998 World Cup. he goal was started by a long ball, sent by defender Frank de Boer over seven Argentine players, who were instantly cut out of the game. Bergkamp's technical ability was rightly praised - but it still needed a good old-fashioned hoof upfield to get the move going.

Sam Allardyce is perhaps English football's most well-known fan of a long-ball strategy. Using arguably the game's most physical front man, Kevin Davies, and a midfielder who knew where the back of the net was in Kevin Nolan, Allardyce oversaw a successful Bolton Wanderers team from 1999-2207.


4-4-2 Narrow

A stranger, more archaic version of the 4-4-2 is to bring the wingers inside and use a platform of four horizontal central midfielders.

I don't know of any clubs or international sides that use this formation to date (if you know any, please comment), but the shape is synonymous with the England side of 1992.

David Platt, Paul Ince, David Batty and Paul Gascoigne all needed to be in the same team, so then-manager Graham Taylor used this formation to incorporate all of the talent.

We haven't seen a libero in a long, long time, but I'm not ruling out its return.

Pep Guardiola has been applauded for tactical innovation, yet most of his brilliance came from working backward through the footballing timeline and bringing things back into fashion.

Franz Beckenbauer was a notable libero, of course, but my focus is on the 1973 Ajax team.

It was Barry Hulshoff who played the sweeping playmaker role for this team, though many don't know that, as they can't see past Johan Cruyff, Johan Neeskens and Ruud Krol.

This 1-3-3-3 was free-flowing, attack-minded and beautiful to watch. The way football is headed right now, it's not inexcusable to believe the libero could return.


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Good information and idea thanks

oh this is great work, thank you so much

We have played in this 3-5-2 formation for the last two games (Temple and Fordham) and I think it is the best formation to maximize our teams potential in the middle and offensively. I think we have been very disciplined defensively in this formation (both games have resulted in a shut out) and we are really starting to get used to the pressure cover relationships that exist across the field. This position allows us to get numbers forward (having that back post runner to follow up) and have better pressure on their backline with two forwards instead of one to force turnovers and cut the field in half. Obviously finishing is a key piece of this puzzle that we need to figure out and as coach Bill said “being mature enough to score.” Once we step up and get the first goal in the formation I think we will be successful in preserving the lead and then capitalizing again to score. In this formation, we should have Annika in the middle, Keefe (Bridget in this position when she is healthy) and Ally on the left side. All of these players are solid defensively and have good composure on the field. Across the midfield, Mary (or Maggie/ Becca) on the right, Lisa in the holding position (Libby as a sub) Abby and Kayla in the midfield (Mattie to sub in) and Myself on the left (sid subbing in). The starting lineup that we have had the last two games is just starting to get the flow and work well with each other/ understand each other’s strengths. Up top, I would start Ryelle and Courtney (Maggie first sub in, Grace next sub) because they have very different styles for playing the same position and I think they compliment each other well. Bottom line, getting a goal is our teams priority and this formation will help.


Variations of the 4-3-3 Formation:

As mentioned above, the 4-3-3 formation is very flexible depending on the personnel available to the coach.

While the defence largely lines up in the same way with only the instructions to the fullbacks varying depending on how comfortable they are attacking, it is the players in front of them that provide the most variation to the formation.

If facing an offensive team, the coach may include two defensive-minded players in the line up.

If up against a weak opponent, more attacking-minded midfielders can be used.

This is the beauty of the formation as the players themselves influence and drastically change its strong points depending on their capabilities.

With all the possible midfield line ups, the players still need to know how to work together and coordinate their play. This will always be the key.

Up front, the forwards again offer a number of different playing options depending on the players available…

If there is a target man up front, then the team will aim to play more into their feet for them to hold it up and will play higher crosses into the box to take advantage of their aerial prowess.

A speedier but smaller striker will instead make more runs in behind the defence and prefer to be on the end of lower crosses.

A creative false 9 will aim to influence the play with their dribbling ability and play-making skills by creating goalscoring opportunities out of seemingly nothing.

While a formation provides a team with structure, it is the players themselves who impact the result of the game through their individual playing styles and how they fit in and work with the rest of their team mates.

Teams must change their approach within the formation to get the best out of the players.

It would make no sense, for example, to keep playing balls in behind the defence if the striker was slow and not very mobile.

The great thing about 4-3-3 formation is that you can quickly change the attacking and defending outlook of the team with just one quick substitution.

For instance, a target man subbed for a speedy striker suddenly changes the whole game plan and forces the opposition to rethink their defensive strategy.

Järeldus:

Attacking at heart, the 4-3-3 formation is a great choice depending on your personnel.

Reliant on hardworking players and athletic fullbacks, the formation also requires tricky wide forwards who can create a lot of goal scoring opportunities.

The team’s movement will create a lot of space in which to play while the energy and pressing of the team can impede the opposition from getting their passing game going and limit the space available to them.

In this formation, attack is the best form of defence and you need high energy players to make the best of it.

What is certain, though, is that you will have a lot of fun playing this formation

Less reliant on tactically astute players than the 3-4-3 formation, the 4-3-3 gives players the flexibility and structure needed for them to express themselves and play to the best of their abilities.


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